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TAX PRINCIPLES AND COORDINATION
OF TRADE AND DOMESTIC POLICIES
UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION
I. INTRODUCTION
Trade liberalization taking the form of reductions in protective measures has
markedly contributed to world trade growth. As is suggested theoretically
and empirically, freer trade renders an individual country and the world
better off.1 However, many countries have still protected their trade flows.
Export taxes are, among others, ‘by far the leading type of export restrictions’
(Fliess and Mard, 2012, p. 14) in the sense that they are used by 16 of the 29
countries in 2009, and 19 of the 35 countries in 2010. More updated evidence
of Evenett and Jenny (2012) reports that export taxes and restrictions are
the fifth top protective measure.2 As a more specific example, WTO (2010, p.
11) states that ‘about one-third of all export taxes recorded in TPRs (Trade
Policy Reviews) cover natural resource sectors,’ and that ‘export taxes occur
with greater frequency in fishing and forestry than in fuels and mining.’
Furthermore, Tarr (2010) empirically finds that Russia greatly benefits from
taxing its export of natural gas.
While these facts suffice to know the relevance of export taxes in modern
world trade, export taxes have received less attention than import tariffs in
the literature for two main reasons. First, one need not separately consider
export taxes because Lerner’s Symmetry Theorem ensures the equivalence
between import tariffs and export taxes. Second, import tariffs are arguably
the most pervasive trade policy. However, depending on the situation, a
straightforward application of tariff analysis is inappropriate since Lerner’s
Theorem is no longer valid under imperfect competition, and ‘the rise of ex-
port taxes relative to other measures may be explained by a lack of discipline
on export taxes in the WTO law’ (Solleder, p. 2) unlike the import tariff.
1Love and Lattimore (2009) provide evidence suggesting welfare gains from trade lib-
eralization.
2The other four are bail-outs, trade remedies, tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
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Given these motivations, this paper considers the welfare effects of ex-
port tax reductions, but our focus is on the comparison between origin-based
production taxes and destination-based consumption taxes that are adjusted
to export tax reductions. More specifically, in a context of an exporting
monopoly, we examine the welfare effects on exporting and importing coun-
tries of export tax reductions accompanied by a change in either of the above
taxes so that the world price is fixed.3 The requirement to fix the world price
owes to an influential work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002). According
to them, if any change in trade taxes conforms to the reciprocity principle
of the GATT/WTO, it must leave the world price unchanged. While they
apply this observation to the multilateral trade reform, the idea therein is
useful in discussing the unilateral trade reform.4 We demonstrate that using
the destination-based consumption tax improves welfare while the opposite
holds under the origin-based production tax. As a result, the choice of do-
mestic taxes is very important in enjoying efficiency gains from export tax
reductions. This conclusion may be helpful in practical policy-making of
export tax reductions.
The coordinated reform of trade and domestic taxes has a large litera-
ture. Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002), assuming
a perfectly competitive small open economy, prove that a point-by-point
tariff reduction associated with a consumption tax increase improves both
welfare and government revenue. However, Keen and Ligthart (2005) show
that the same no longer survives a duopoly model.5 These authors assume
the case of import tariffs, but the case of export taxes is dealt with by Emran
(2005) and Emran and Stiglitz (2005). Emran (2005) shows a welfare- and
revenue-increasing possibility of reducing export taxes and raising production
taxes whereas Emran and Stiglitz (2005) turn to the welfare effects of reduc-
3The model we develop is similar to that of Ishikawa (2000), Ishikawa and Kuroda
(2007), and Ishikawa and Mukunoki (2008a, b).
4We do not say that our policy reform either conforms to the reciprocity of the
GATT/WTO or that it is reciprocity-based.
5The result of Keen and Ligthart (2005) is challenged by Naito and Abe (2008) and
Fujiwara (2013) both of whom demonstrate the welfare- and revenue-improving possibility.
3
ing export taxes and raising consumption taxes. But, the previous studies
neither address the world-price-fixing policy reform nor allow for imperfect
competition in the exporting sector.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a model, and exam-
ines the welfare of the world-price-fixing policy reform in the case of origin-
based production taxes. The case of destination-based consumption taxes is
considered in Section III. Section IV compares our case with the perfectly
competitive case of a small open economy, and briefly addresses the case
of segmented markets while the main text focuses on the case of integrated
markets. Section V concludes. The mathematical proofs of the main results
are left into Appendix.
II. ORIGIN-BASED PRODUCTION TAXES
This section examines a welfare effect of a world-price-fixing reform composed
of an export tax reduction and a production tax increase.6 Suppose two
countries Home and Foreign, with an asterisk (*) denoting a Foreign variable.
The utility function of each country is given by:
U = u(C1) + C2, U
∗ = u∗(C∗1) + C
∗
2 , (1)
where U,C1 and C2 are utility and consumption of Goods 1 and 2, respec-
tively, u(·) is an increasing, and strictly concave function, and Foreign’s vari-
ables are similarly defined. Letting p and p∗ be a (consumer) price of Good 1
measured by Good 2, utility maximization under the budget constraint yields
u′(C1) = p and u∗
′
(C∗1) = p
∗, which are inverted to get demand functions
D(p) ≡ u′−1(p) and D∗(p∗) ≡ u∗′−1(p∗).
The Home government imposes an export tax t and an origin-based pro-
duction tax s both of which take a specific (per-unit) form whereas Foreign
observes levies an import tariff t∗. Then, the relationship between the do-
mestic prices and the world price pW is given by p+t = pW and p∗ = pW +t∗.
6We may interchangeably use two terminologies ‘origin-based tax’ (resp. ‘destination-
based tax’) and ‘production tax’ (resp. ‘consumption tax’) to have the same meaning.
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And, Good 1 is monopolistically supplied by a Home firm whose output is
denoted by X. When the world market is integrated, the market-clearing
condition is7
D(p) +D∗(p∗) = D(p) +D∗(p+ t+ t∗) = X. (2)
The Home price p that solves (2) is given by a function of X and t + t∗ as
p(X, t+ t∗) that has the following properties.
pX(X, t+ t
∗) ≡ ∂p(X, t+ t
∗)
∂X
=
1
D′ +D∗′
< 0 (3)
pT (X, t+ t
∗) ≡ ∂p(X, t+ t
∗)
∂T
= − D
∗′
D′ +D∗′
< 0, (4)
where T ≡ t + t∗. In this paper, we assume linear demand so that pXX =
pXT = pTT = 0. While this is undoubtedly a restrictive assumption, it allows
us to obtain clear results.
Making use of the inverse demand function p(·), the profit of the Home
firm is defined by p(X, t+ t∗)X− cX− sX, where c ≥ is a constant marginal
cost. The first- and second-order conditions for profit maximization are8
XpX + p− c− s = 0, 2pX < 0. (5)
Totally differentiating the first-order condition, we have9
2pXdX = −pTdt+ ds, (6)
and thus the equilibrium output responds to the two tax rates as follows.
∂X
∂t
= − pT
2pX
,
∂X
∂s
=
1
2pX
. (7)
Using (7), we now define a world-price-fixing reform. To this end, let us
note that the change in the world price pW = p(X, t+ t∗) + t is
dpW =
(
pX
∂X
∂t
+ pT + 1
)
dt+ pX
∂X
∂s
ds.
7Section IV deals with the segmented market case.
8In what follows, any argument of a function is suppressed unless any confusion arises.
9Note that the second-derivatives of p(·) are all zero from the assumption of linear
demand.
5
Therefore, the requirement that the world price is frozen is given by dpW = 0,
and we have
ds = −pX
∂X
∂t
+ pT + 1
pX
∂X
∂s
dt = −(pT+2)dt = −2D
′ −D∗′
D′ +D∗′
dt =
−1− D
′
D′ +D∗′︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
 dt,
(8)
where the last equality uses (3) and (4).
Eq. (8) suggests that the production tax must be raised so that the world
price remains constant (ds > 0), and that the production tax must be raised
by more than the reduced export tax (|ds| > |dt|). The reasons for these
properties of the reform are as follows. When Home unilaterally reduces an
export tax, the associated change in the world price is computed as
dpW =
(
pX
∂X
∂t
+ pT
)
dt+ dt =
pT
2
dt+ dt.
According to this equation, a reduction in export taxes affects the world
price in two ways. The first effect, which is captured by the first term in
the right-hand side, gives the (indirect) effect associated with an increase in
exports. Noting that the consumer price of Foreign is p+ t+ t∗, a reduction
in t encourages Foreign demand, and hence raises the world price as is in-
dicated by (pT/2)dt > 0. The second effect is given by the last term in the
above equation, which is a direct effect on the world price. As is inferred
from the case of fixed world prices (small open economy), a fall in export
taxes decreases the world price by expanding Home exports. In our model,
the second effect is stronger than the first effect, and hence the world price
declines as a result of export tax reductions.
Accordingly, the Home government needs to prevent the world price from
falling by discouraging domestic production with a higher production tax.
In addition, domestic production has to be over-taxed since the production
tax alone is available. These properties of the reform in (8) will be helpful
in interpreting its welfare effect.
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When ds in the right-hand side of (6) is replaced with (8), it becomes
−pTdt+ ds = −2(pT + 1)dt.
The rest of our task is to compute comparative statics outcomes associated
with this change in t. A simple manipulation leads to the output change:
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −pT + 1
pX
. (9)
We now investigate the welfare effect of the above-defined tax reform.
First of all, note that the proposed reform leaves Foreign neither better-
nor worse-off since the Foreign welfare depends only on the world price,
which is kept constant by construction. Therefore, we have only to know
the welfare effect on Home in order to check whether this reform is strictly
Pareto-improving, i.e., it raises the Home welfare without hurting Foreign in
the absence of international transfers. Leaving the proof into Appendix, the
main text states the main result.
Proposition 1: The integrated reform of export tax reductions and origin-
based production tax increases that fixes the world price reduces welfare of
Home, and achieves a strict Pareto deterioration.
We now intuitively interpret Proposition 1. As has already been ad-
dressed, the proposed tax reform requires the Home government to over-tax
domestic production to cancel out the decline in the world price led by export
tax reductions. The resultant effects of this reform are summarized in the
first low of Table 1.
(Table 1 around here)
The natural consequence of the taxation on domestic production is that
production becomes smaller. This output contraction raises the domestic
price in Home while leaving the world price unaltered, and hence reduces
Home’s consumer surplus. Furthermore, the Home firm also losses its profit
7
from the decreased output. While the effect on government tax revenue G is
unclear, the overall effect on welfare turns to be negative because the negative
effects on consumer surplus and the firm profit play a dominant role. Taking
into account that Foreign’s welfare remains unchanged, the proposed policy
reform ends up with a strict Pareto deterioration.
This result clearly suggests that using an origin-based production tax to
accommodate trade liberalization is not recommended. Then, one naturally
asks: what if the production tax is replaced by a destination-based consump-
tion tax? We answer this question in the next section.
III. DESTINATION-BASED CONSUMPTION TAXES
This section examines how the negative evaluation in the last section is mod-
ified if a destination-based consumption tax is employed instead of an origin-
based production tax. As will be clear, this alternative reform strategy has a
desirable property in the sense that it ensures a strict Pareto improvement.
When the Home government imposes a destination-based consumption
tax τ and an export tax t, and the Foreign government uses an import tariff
t∗, we have a relationship between the two countries’ domestic prices and the
world price as follows: p + t = pW + τ and p∗ = pW + t∗. Thus, eliminating
pW , the world market-clearing condition is
D(p) +D∗(p∗) = D(p) +D∗(p+ t+ t∗ − τ) = X. (10)
Solving (10) for p gives p(X, t+ t∗ − τ) with the following properties:
pX(X, t+ t
∗ − τ) ≡ ∂p(X, t+ t
∗ − τ)
∂X
=
1
D′ +D∗′
< 0 (11)
pT (X, t+ t
∗ − τ) ≡ ∂p(X, t+ t
∗ − τ)
∂T
= − D
∗′
D′ +D∗′
< 0, (12)
where T ≡ t + t∗ − τ . Using this inverse demand function, the profit of the
Home firm is defined by [p(X, t + t∗ − τ) − τ ]X − cX, and the first- and
second-order conditions for profit maximization are
XpX + p− c− τ = 0, 2pX < 0. (13)
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Recalling the assumption of linear demand, total differentiation of the
first-order condition yields
2pXdX = −pTdt+ (pT + 1)dτ , (14)
which leads to the comparative statics outcomes as follows.
∂X
∂t
= − pT
2pX
,
∂X
∂τ
=
pT + 1
2pX
. (15)
We are ready to define the world-price-fixing change in destination-based
consumption taxes and export taxes. Considering that in the present case
the world price is pW = p(X, t+ t∗ − τ) + t− τ , its change associated with a
small increment in t and τ becomes
dpW =
(
pX
∂X
∂t
+ pT + 1
)
dt+
(
pX
∂X
∂τ
− pT − 1
)
dτ.
Accordingly, in order to leave pW unaltered, the two tax rates must change
according to
dτ = −pX
∂X
∂t
+ pT + 1
pX
∂X
∂τ
− pT − 1
dt =
pT + 2
pT + 1
dt =
2D′ +D∗
′
D′
dt =
1 + D
′ +D∗
′
D′︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
 dt,
(16)
by setting dpW = 0. The last equality is obtained by substituting (11) and
(12). Eq. (16) provides us with two properties of the reform similar to the
production tax case.
The origin-based consumption tax must be lowered (dτ < 0), and the
extent of the reduction in consumption tax must be larger than the extent
of the export tax reduction (|dτ | > |dt|). As was noted in the previous
section, an export tax reduction results in a fall in the world price. Thus,
the Home government should encourage domestic consumption by lowering
the consumption tax so as to keep the world price unaltered. Furthermore,
because the origin-based consumption tax can affect only the consumption,
the Home government needs to over-reduce the consumption tax.
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Substituting dτ above into (14), its right-hand side is rewritten as
−pTdt+ (pT + 1)dτ = (−pT + pT + 2)dt = 2dt.
That is, making comparative statics under this reform amounts to making
comparative statics under this change in t. Then, the equilibrium output is
affected by the reform as
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
1
pX
. (17)
Straightforward manipulations give rise to:
Proposition 2: The integrated reform of export tax reductions and destination-
based consumption tax reductions that fixes the world price raises welfare of
Home, and achieves a strict Pareto improvement.
The second low of Table 1 allows us to develop the intuitions behind
Proposition 2. As was commented, the Home government over-reduces the
consumption tax in response to the reduced export tax. This reduction in the
consumption tax naturally increases domestic consumption, which involves
a gain in consumer surplus. The Home firm, on the other hand, expands
output in response to this incremental demand, which leads to an increase
in the firm profit. Although the effect on government revenue is ambiguous,
the total effect on welfare ends up being positive since the favorable effects
on consumer surplus and the firm profit are large enough to overweigh the
government revenue effect. Since Foreign is neither better-off nor worse-off,
the proposed reform guarantees a strict Pareto improvement, namely, it raises
the Home welfare without hurting Foreign.
It is worth mentioning that Propositions 1 and 2 provide a simple but
important implication concerning the comparison of two tax bases. They
propose adopting destination-based consumption taxes rather than origin-
based production taxes if they accompany the export tax reductions, and
the reform is subject to the constraint that Foreign is left no-worse-off.
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As we reviewed in Introduction, the superiority of the destination-based
consumption tax over the origin-based production tax has already been demon-
strated by Keen et al. (2002), Haufler and Pfluger (2004) and Haufler et al.
(2005). While Keen et al. (2002) reach this conclusion in a context of tax
harmonization with an oligopoly model, Haufler and Pfluger (2004) (resp.
Haufler et al. (2005)) obtain the same in a context of a noncooperative tax
setting with a monopolistically competitive model (resp. a segmented mar-
ket oligopoly model). Our findings could complement these contributions in
the sense that we have also shown the superiority of the destination tax in a
context of a trade and domestic tax reform which has not been considered.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
This section compares our results with the perfectly competitive case of a
small open economy, and then briefly mentions the setting of market seg-
mentation.
Small open economy
The reform of trade and domestic taxes is addressed in Hatzipanayotou et
al. (1994), Keen and Ligthart (2002), Emran (2005), and Emran and Stiglitz
(2005), all of which assume a small open country and a point-by-point re-
placement of trade taxes with a domestic tax. While their arguments are
proved mathematically, the key idea is understood by noting that the ef-
fect of an export tax is decomposed into the effect of a production tax and
that of a consumption subsidy. Thus, reducing the export tax and raising
the production tax simultaneously ensures a welfare improvement because
the export-tax-distorted consumption is removed, with the production level
unchanged. This result is in sharp contrast to Proposition 1 above, and the
reason for this difference in conclusions is attributed to the effect on domestic
production. In the case of perfect competition, the tax reform (positively)
affects on the consumer without affecting the producer since |ds| = |dt|. In
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contrast, both domestic production as well as domestic consumption is influ-
enced by the reform because the fixed world prices require |ds| > |dt|, which
eventually leads to welfare losses.
If, on the other hand, export tax reductions are accompanied by con-
sumption tax decreases in a point-by-point way (|dt| = |dτ |), domestic con-
sumption is kept constant but export-tax-distorted production is eliminated,
thereby improving welfare. This positive welfare effect is qualitatively the
same as Proposition 2, welfare improvements in our model are due to output
expansion induced by the reform.
Segmented markets
While the foregoing arguments hinge on the assumption that the world goods
market is integrated, it may be useful to address the case of segmented mar-
kets. We show that results similar to Propositions 1 and 2 survive market
segmentation. Formally, we can claim:
Proposition 3: The integrated reform of export tax reductions and origin
(resp. destination) -based production (resp. consumption) tax changes that
fixes the world price reduces (resp. raises) welfare of Home, and achieves a
strict Pareto deterioration (resp. improvement).
(Table 2 around here)
While most of the intuitions behind Propositions 1 and 2 are valid in the
segmented market case as well, we should note that the suggested reform
changes the Foreign welfare unlike the integrated market case (see Table
2). This is because the effect of the reform on the delivery into the Foreign
market becomes non-zero. In spite of this difference, the final results are
parallel between the cases of integrated markets and segmented markets.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
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This paper has explored how the difference between origin-based production
taxes and destination-based consumption taxes affects the welfare effect of a
trade and tax reform. We have established that a world-price-fixing reform
has a positive welfare effect under destination-based consumption taxes while
the opposite holds under origin-based production taxes. Our result may be a
helpful reference in the debate over the choice of the two tax principles that
has been made in a context of tax harmonization and a noncooperative tax
setting.
Despite the above novelty, we have admittedly made a number of simpli-
fying assumptions to make the result as transparent as possible. First, we
have focused on the case of integrated markets in which an arbitrage between
the two countries is allowed. However, we can show that the main results in
this paper are true of market segmentation. Second, we have intentionally
chosen a model of international monopoly in which the profit-shifting effect
is absent. The biggest limitation of this setting is that we can not properly
discuss a reduction in import tariffs. In view of the fact that import tariffs
are the most popular trade policies, we need to make a further analysis by
comprising an import tariff. These extensions and further elaborations are
left as future research agenda.
APPENDIX
a) Proof of Proposition 1
Home’s welfare W consists of consumer surplus CS, the firm profit pi and
government revenue G each of which is defined as
CS ≡ u(D(p(X, t+ t∗)))− p(X, t+ t∗)D(p(X, t+ t∗)) (18)
pi ≡ p(X, t+ t∗)X − cX − sX (19)
G ≡ sX + t[X −D(p(X, t+ t∗))], (20)
where X in these equations is affected by s and t.
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The change in CS associated with the suggested reform is10
∂CS
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −D ·
pX ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
 = D, (21)
because (9) is equivalent to
pX
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT = −1.
The change in pi is
∂pi
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= pTX − ∂s
∂t
X = 2(pT + 1)X, (22)
where we have used (8) to replace ∂s above. Finally, the change in G becomes
∂G
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
∂s
∂t
X + s
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+X −D + t
 ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
−D′ ·
pX ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT

= X −D + (t+ s) ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+
∂s
∂t
X − tD′ ·
pX ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT

= X −D − (t+ s)(pT + 1)
pX
− (pT + 2)X + tD′. (23)
Summing up Eqs. (21)-(23) and rearranging terms, the welfare effect is
eventually obtained as
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
(XpX − t− s)(pT + 1) + tpXD′
pX
,
which, by using (3) and (4), simplifies to
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= (XpX − s)D′ = −(p− c)D′ > 0, (24)
where the right-hand side uses the first-order condition for profit maximiza-
tion.
10The utility maximization condition u′ = p is used to obtain (21).
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Note finally that the Foreign welfare is unchanged with this reform be-
cause both consumer surplus and tariff revenue solely depend on the world
price pW as follows.
CS∗ ≡ u∗
(
D∗
(
pW + t∗
))
−
(
pW + t∗
)
D∗
(
pW + t∗
)
G∗ ≡ t∗D∗
(
pW + t∗
)
.
b) Proof of Proposition 2
Once we know (17), the effects on three components of welfare are found just
by differentiations and substitutions. Home’s welfare consists of
CS ≡ u(D(p(X, t+ t∗ − τ)))− p(X, t+ t∗ − τ)D(p(X, t+ t∗ − τ))(25)
pi ≡ [p(X, t+ t∗ − τ)− τ ]X − cX (26)
G ≡ τD(p(X, t+ t∗ − τ)) + t[X −D(p(X, t+ t∗ − τ))]. (27)
Since the rest of our manipulations is the same as those in the previous
section, it suffices to briefly outline the argument.
The change in CS is
∂CS
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −D ·
pX ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1− ∂τ
∂t
)
= − D
pT + 1
, (28)
by noting that
pX
∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1− ∂τ
∂t
)
=
1
pT + 1
.
The change in pi is
∂pi
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= pTX +
(
pT
−∂τ
∂t
− ∂τ
∂t
)
X = −2X, (29)
Finally, the change in G is
∂G
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
∂τ
∂t
D + τD′ ·
pX ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1− ∂τ
∂t
)+X −D
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+t
 ∂X∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
−D′ ·
pX ∂X
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
+ pT
(
1− ∂τ
∂t
)
= X +
D
pXD′
+
τ
pX
. (30)
Summing up Eqs. (28)-(30) and rearranging terms, the welfare effect turns
out to be
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
−XpX + τ
pX
= (p− c)
(
D′ +D∗
′)
< 0. (31)
where the right-hand side uses the first-order condition (13).
Since the proposed reform leaves the Foreign welfare unaltered, we have
arrived at Proposition 2.
c) Proof of Proposition 3
When the market of the two countries is segmented, the market-clearing
condition is D(p) = x and D∗(p∗) = x∗, which is inverted to get the inverse
demand functions: p(x) and p∗(x∗). In the case of origin taxation, the mo-
nopolist’s profit is p(x)x+ p∗(x∗)x∗ − c · (x+ x∗)− s · (x+ x∗)− (t+ t∗)x∗,
and hence the first-order conditions for profit maximization are
xp′ + p− c− s = 0, x∗p∗′ + p∗ − c− s− t− t∗ = 0. (32)
Totally differentiating (32), we have
∂x
∂t
= 0,
∂x
∂s
=
1
2p′
. (33)
Since the world price of Good 1 is defined by pW = p(x) + t, the change in
the export tax and the production tax that fixes it is given by
dpW =
(
p′
∂x
∂t
+ 1
)
dt+ p′
∂x
∂s
ds = 0
⇒ ds = −p
′∂x/∂t+ 1
p′∂x/∂s
dt = −2dt,
where use is made of (33). Applying the same manipulation as the case of
integrated markets, the present reform affects x and x∗ as follows.
∂x
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= − 1
p′
,
∂x∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= − 1
2p∗′
. (34)
16
In this case, consumer surplus, the firm profit, and tax revenue in each
country is
CS ≡
∫ x
0
p(y)dy − p(x)x
pi ≡ p(x)x+ p∗(x∗)x∗ − c · (x+ x∗)− s · (x+ x∗)− (t+ t∗)x∗
G ≡ tx∗ + s · (x+ x∗)
CS∗ ≡
∫ x∗
0
p∗(y∗)dy∗ − p∗(x∗)x∗
G∗ ≡ t∗x∗.
Differentiating these welfare components with respect to t, and substituting
(34), the welfare effect on each country is computed as follows.
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −p− c
p′
− t+ s
2p∗′
> 0,
∂W ∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
= −p
∗ − c− s− t
2p∗′
> 0.
Table 2 summarizes the effect of the reform on each component above. What
differs from the integrated market case is that the Foreign welfare (negatively)
changes as a result of the suggested reform. Despite this difference, we can
conclude that the reform is detrimental to the world welfare since both Home
and Foreign lose from it.
Let us finally address the case where the destination-based consumption
is imposed. We outline the core arguments very briefly because one has only
to iterate the above manipulations. In the presence of a consumption tax τ ,
the Home firm’s profit is p(x)x+p∗(x∗)x∗− c · (x+x∗)− τx− (t+ t∗)x∗. The
first-order conditions are
xp′ + p− c− τ = 0, x∗p∗′ + p∗ − c− t− t∗ = 0.
Taking into account that the world price is equal to pW = p(x)− t− τ , the
two taxes must change according to dτ = 2dt so as to fix pW . Utilizing this
observation, the output effects are obtained as
∂x
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
1
p′
,
∂x∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
1
2p∗′
.
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The welfare components of each country are defined analogously to the
production tax case, excepting that the Home tax revenue is now defined by
G ≡ tx∗ + τx. The final outcome is
∂W
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
p− c
p′
+
t
2p∗′
< 0,
∂W ∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣∣
dpW=0
=
p∗ − c− t
2p∗′
< 0,
from which we can say that the present reform favorably affects both the
Home and the Foreign countries.
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X CS pi G W W ∗ W +W ∗
production tax − − − ? − 0 −
consumption tax + + + ? + 0 +
Table 1: The effects of the reforms (integrated markets)
x+ x∗ CS pi G W CS∗ G∗ W ∗ W +W ∗
production tax − − − ? − − − − −
consumption tax + + + ? + + + + +
Table 2: The effects of the reforms (segmented markets)
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